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The purpose of this paper is to provide an account of changes in the family construct of the 
Singaporean Overseas Chinese resulting from migration, settlement, and public policy. The 
family institution then changes in response to family policy, so that today it bears little 
resemblance to the traditional blueprint. Differences between the family institutions of the three 
major racial groups in Singapore have emerged as a result of discriminatory policy pressures. 
The Singaporean government has used family planning policies to create the ideal social 
structure and human resource capital, possibly at the expense of Malays and women with less 
education. The fate of the Overseas Chinese family institution in Singapore may also differ to its 
counterpart in Malaysia. In Malaysia, the pro-Malay affirmative action program has contributed 
to a dramatic reduction in Overseas Chinese fertility, whilst creating unintended consequences 
that are not easily reversible. Both examples lend credence to the “minority status hypothesis” 
on family planning.  The paper concludes with issues for macromarketing scholars to ponder.  
 
Introduction 
 
Industrialization has triggered demographic transition in many countries and its effect on 
the family institution is apparent. Family size is rapidly diminishing, populations are ageing, and 
family units are increasingly isolated. The purpose of this paper is to discuss how the family 
construct has changed through the immigration and settlement of the Overseas Chinese in 
Singapore. The context of this paper follows Chinese migrants who immigrated to Singapore 
between the turn of the 20th century and the Second World War as a result of uncertain socio-
economic conditions in rural Southern China. They are collectively referred to as huaqiao or the 
sojourner migrants (Wang 1991).  
 
The Traditional Chinese Family 
 
The traditional Chinese family is characterized by values derived from the Confucian 
ideal of preservation of harmony (Kuo 1987; Slote 1998). According to Confucius and Mencius, 
the reinforcement of the ‘Five Bonds’ are necessary for a harmonious society. These are the 
authority of the ruler over his subjects, the authority of the father over his son, the authority of 
the husband over his wife, the authority of the elder brother over his younger brother, and the 
kinship shared between friends (Zhou, Shi, and Xu 1982). Slote (1998, 39) observes that “the 
hierarchy is centered on the image of the ultimate benevolent father – omniscient, omnipotent, 
and protective – and is a derivation of certain stages of psychological development of a child that 
sees the parent as an all-fulfilling and all-powerful godlike figure”. This patriarchal authority 
over family dynamics and the cultural values of Chinese society is inextricably linked through 
the Confucian ethic. Therefore, a large part of traditional Chinese culture is bound to the family. 
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The traditional Chinese family construct is very complex and scholars such as Baker (1979) 
provide more elaborate accounts of its structure and dynamics than what the scope of this paper 
permits. Nonetheless, there are three characteristics that are of interest in this paper: (1) 
deference to paternalistic authority, (2) patrilineal nuclear family (preference for males), and (3) 
interdependence on extended family.  
 
In a traditional Chinese family, the son is not to question the authority of his father; nor is 
the wife to question the authority of her husband. Obedience and solidarity are expected from 
family members, whilst grievances and dissent have to be restrained. The father is a feared and 
distant figure whose role is to teach, direct, and discipline. Thus, he is restrained from any 
displays of affection (Slote 1998). Only the eldest son can succeed the father as the head of the 
household and is expected to provide care to his parents in their old age. When a daughter 
marries, she leaves her family to join her husband’s family where her new role is primarily to 
assist with household chores and bearing children. Baker (1979) observed that women are 
‘acquired’ to help families achieve key tasks, such as the enlargement of the family in order to 
compete better with rival families. In agrarian China, family size matters; hence, the basic unit of 
a traditional Chinese family often includes the extended family comprising several generations. 
Large families provide an ample and steady supply of labor to generate wealth for the family.  
 
The traditional Chinese family construct also extended beyond the household to include 
the entire village. Since Chinese lineage is patrilineal and family landholdings were subdivided 
among sons, members of a settlement or village often shared one surname and each household 
was bound together by consanguineal relationships. This kinship among villagers was 
economically beneficial. Members worked together on capital improvements such as digging 
wells, making roads, and, since the lineage held the land collectively, building ancestral temples. 
The extended family construct gave each member a sense of solidarity and identity that 
distinguished them from other villages. This is the familial context with which the emigrant 
leaves China. 
 
Migration: The Overseas Chinese  
 
Warlordism, banditry, civil wars, and revolution had further impoverished the rural areas 
of Fujian and Guangdong provinces in southern China. Meanwhile, new export industries in 
colonial Southeast Asia required more laborers. The British in the Straits Settlements (current-
day Malaysia and Singapore) recruited labor from China to work in the tin mines. Earlier 
Chinese settlers who had established businesses in growing industries often looked to recruit 
relatives from their home village as workers. These factors brought the sojourner Chinese 
migrant to Singapore. The sojourning migrant is characterized by mercenary intentions of 
pursuing economic gains in the short-term, but ultimately wanting to return to the home country 
with accumulated riches (Bonacich 1973). Money was remitted back to China to acquire land 
and other investments back home, thus suggesting that the sojourner made every preparation to 
retire there. Until then, the sojourner made the journey alone, often leaving this family behind. 
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The Chinese Family Abroad 
 
The institution of the family changes in the host country because of the allegiances 
migrants make when they arrive in the host country. If the conditions there are hostile and 
unwelcoming, migrants often seek others from the same kinship or ‘clan’ to gain strength in 
numbers. This kinship comprises several broad associations including known relatives who are 
already established in the host country, earlier settlers who share their surname and/or originate 
from the same village in China, and fellow villagers (often with the same surname) who 
embarked on the journey together. Since most Chinese huaqiao were male, they swore a ‘blood 
brotherhood’ which even included non-relations for the sake of solidarity (Baker 1979).  
 
These mock kinships gradually evolved into more formal institutions, resulting in 
hundreds of clan associations – commonly referred to as huiguan – which are distinguished 
mostly by dialect groups first, then by territory of origin or surname (Wickberg 1998). The 
huiguan provided new migrants with food, clothing, as well as the opportunity to partake in 
cultural rituals such as religious and ancestor worship. The huiguan’s most important 
contribution to the migrant’s adaptation to the host country was access to employment. New 
arrivals were often recruited into the businesses of entrepreneurs who were either relatives or 
members of the same huiguan. As more clan members were ‘pulled’ into a particular trade, a 
chain migration pattern started to emerge. 
 
The benefits and obligations of clan membership in host countries stirred the migrant’s 
consciousness about kinship, possibly expanding the family institution to include a second 
family of ‘relations’ in the host country. Once the migrant became more well-established, he 
would then be able to bring his nuclear family over to be reunited in the host country. The 
sojourn ended when the migrant and his family decide to adopt the host country as their new 
home. 
 
The Overseas Chinese Family in Singapore 
 
The British welcomed the migration of Chinese who would supply the human resource 
required for their development plans of Singapore and the rest of the Straits Settlements. 
Unskilled Chinese ‘coolies’ were recruited to work in the tin mines; while other migrants were 
sought for their prowess in trade. British official Sir Stamford Raffles, widely regarded as the 
founder of Singapore, had plans to develop Singapore as a trading port to market various 
products from the West and opium from India. Raffle’s laissez-faire approach to development 
also allowed the different dialect groups from China to carve out economic niches for itself 
(Chiew 1995). Based on Raffle’s urban development plan, residential areas were also segmented 
by dialect groups, resulting in a spatial concentration of Chinese clans and family groups not 
dissimilar to villages in their rural homeland (Cheng 1995).  
 
Demographic statistics published in the 1990 Singapore Census of Population recorded 
the influx of Chinese migrants in Singapore (Kwok 1998). In 1824, the population of Singapore 
was just over 10,000, 31% of which were ethnic Chinese. At the height of the Chinese huaqiao 
migration wave in 1931, the population of Singapore grew to over 550,000, 75% of which were 
ethnic Chinese. The most recent census reports that Chinese is still the largest ethnic group in 
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Singapore (Leow 2000). As a result, the national identity and ideology are largely influenced by 
Chinese culture and the Confucian ethic.  
 
The Traditional Chinese Family in Singapore 
 
Chain migration from China leading up to the Second World War altered the 
demographic profile of Singapore’s population. The Chinese were now the new ethnic majority 
and most of the male migrants were able to either sponsor the migration of their wives and 
children or establish new families in their adopted host country. The gender balance was re-
established and a greater proportion of the Chinese population is Singapore-born. During the 
post-war baby boom, which continued until the mid 1960s, nearly 80% of population growth was 
attributable to a natural increase rather than migration (Cheng 1989). The total fertility rate 
peaked in 1957, with more than six children per woman (Yap 2003). The Chinese family 
consisted of a large nuclear family and a network of other families related by kin, clan, or dialect 
group. 
 
Cultural values are linked to reproduction, childbearing, and the preferred size of a 
complete family (Beaver 1975; Handwerker 1986). Therefore, anthropologists argue that cultural 
transformation underlies the demographic transition and changes in fertility observed in many 
societies. As the Chinese migrant becomes more established and well-adjusted in the company of 
other migrants from the same clan or dialect group in Singapore, the most familiar type of family 
structure is recreated. This culture is rooted in an agrarian society where a large family was 
beneficial. However, the conditions in Singapore are markedly different. Specifically, the 
traditional Chinese family institution became incompatible with the government’s vision of a 
modern Singapore. 
 
The Singapore Government and its Influence on the Population 
 
Since its independence from the Malaysian Federation in 1965, Singapore has been 
governed by a Chinese-dominated People’s Action Party guided by Lee Kuan Yew and his 
vision of building a modern and industrialized city-state. Most Singaporeans regard Mr. Lee as 
the patriarch of modern Singapore, under whom many have prospered during the country’s rapid 
economic development in the last four decades. Singapore’s GDP per capita rose from US$701 
in 1968 to US$37,597 in 2008 (Statistics Singapore 2009). The government recognized that, 
since Singapore lacked natural resources, it needed to rely heavily on human resources to 
industrialize the economy. The government made significant investments in education and 
training to upgrade the workforce to higher value-added industries such as shipping, oil refining, 
manufacturing, and banking. During that period, the literacy rate in Singapore rose from under 
60% in the 1960s to 98% in 2008 (Statistics Singapore 2009). Already highly-regarded by 
businesses from the West for its high standards in education and English, Singapore was also 
well-poised to benefit from the recent economic growth of China because its Chinese population 
was proficient in Chinese business culture, as well as being fluent in Mandarin. 
 
Singapore also had to undergo a significant demographic transformation. In the formative 
years during the 1960s, the government was faced with a high unemployment rate, limited 
industrial base, scarce land and natural resources, and a growing population. The government’s 
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broad response to this predicament was to improve the quality of human resources while limiting 
its quantity. This approach gave rise to anti-natalist and other social engineering policies that 
may seem discriminatory and invasive to Western observers. However, since one of Confucius’ 
‘Five Bonds’ is the ruler’s authority over his subjects, the Confucian ethic appeared to grant 
some permissibility for the government to intervene in the private affairs of the individual and 
family. Government intervention brought significant changes to the traditional Chinese family 
institution in Singapore. Some of these were inadvertent or unanticipated, and irreversible.  
 
Government Policy on Nuclear Families 
 
In 1966, following the Singapore government’s tightening of immigration controls, the 
statutory Singapore Family Planning and Population Board was established to limit population 
growth. The Board introduced a range of incentives and controls, collectively known as the 
“Stop at Two” policy, in order to reduce the fertility rate. Several authors have catalogued these 
measures (e.g. Palen 1986; Quah and Quah 1989; Graham 1995; Teo and Yeoh 1999). They 
include: 
 
• Income tax relief for the first three children only; 
• Paid maternity leave for only the first two children; 
• Higher hospital delivery fees for each child after the second; 
• Higher priority in public housing for smaller families (75% of the population lived in 
public housing); 
• Higher priority in the choice of primary school for the first three children if their parents 
underwent voluntary sterilization. 
 
These measures, along with the subsequent liberalization of abortion laws to facilitate 
abortion on demand, were extremely effective in lowering the fertility rate. The fertility rate 
dropped from 4.66 children per woman in 1965 to 1.73 children in 1980 (Yap 2003; Cheng 
1989). The fertility rate for Chinese women was 1.66 children, substantially lower than 
counterparts in other ethnic groups. The government, by succeeded in limiting population 
growth, soon realized that there were other concomitant demographic trends and inadvertent 
policy effects occurring. In just a decade after instituting anti-natalist measures, the fertility rate 
dipped below the replacement level. This trend, coupled with a rapid delay in marriages and 
childbearing, meant that the size of Singapore’s human resource would likely decline in the next 
generation. This concern prompted a policy reversal by the government in the 1980s. 
 
The government’s worries about a population decline were compounded by an 
unanticipated fertility pattern. In a public address to the country in 1983, Mr. Lee expressed 
concern that well-educated women were increasingly unmarried and having fewer children than 
less-educated women (1.65 children and 3.5 children, respectively). He implied that this trend 
would be detrimental to the eugenic quality of Singapore (Palen 1986). He ascribed genetics and 
education as two key determinants of achievement, and was determined to improve the ‘national 
IQ’ even if it meant selective breeding. The government instituted a controversial population 
policy to achieve two objectives: to increase fertility of educated women, and to decrease fertility 
of uneducated women. Consequently, even more incentives and controls were introduced. Palen 
(1986) lists some of these measures:  
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• Children of graduate mothers received highest priority in their choice of primary school; 
• Higher tax relief for each of the first three children of graduate mothers; 
• Childcare subsidies to encourage graduate mothers to rejoin the workforce; 
• Cash grant of up to $10,000 for non-graduate mothers who opt for voluntary sterilization 
after the second child; 
• Establishment of the Social Development Unit, a bureau which enables graduate men to 
meet graduate women for the purpose of increasing marriage rates among graduates. 
 
The government abolished this policy after a public outcry concerning the discrimination 
of non-graduate mothers. The effect of these measures is still not clear since the disparity in 
marriage and fertility rates among graduate and non-graduate mothers persists today. 
Nonetheless, the government’s message was clear. It had a vision of Singapore as an 
achievement-oriented society and was not afraid to exercise its authority to engineer such a 
society. This policy was short-lived but it provided the template for a new, more inclusive, pro-
natalist family planning policy.  
 
In 1987, the government instituted the New Population Policy to replace the anti-natalist 
population program (Cheung 1989). The Family Planning and Population Board was replaced by 
the Population Planning Unit and the Family Life Education Unit. This was designed to reflect a 
greater emphasis on educating young Singaporeans on the value of family life (Teo and Yeoh 
1999). These agencies were charged with the difficult task of raising the fertility rate against the 
backdrop of increasing modernization, competition, and empowerment of the individual and 
specifically women (Graham 1995). The anti-natalist campaign of “Stop at Two” was now 
replaced by the pro-natalist campaign of “Have Three, or More if You Can Afford It”. Many old 
policy instruments were revised: 
 
• Whereas before smaller families had received higher priority in public housing, now 
larger families (three children or more) received higher priority; 
• Whereas before, income tax relief had been awarded for the first three children, now it 
was awarded for each child, with additional tax rebates for the third child onwards; 
• Whereas before, higher hospital delivery fees had been levied for each subsequent child 
after the second, now hospital delivery fees were subsidized for each subsequent child 
after the third; 
• Whereas before, abortions were available on demand, now women with fewer than three 
children seeking abortion were required to undergo counseling. 
 
Policy Implications 
 
To date, these policies have not been able to reverse the trend of declining fertility. This 
problem is not unique to Singapore. Populations in many industrialized countries are also ageing 
and unable to replace themselves. However, the Singaporean government has demonstrated that 
it is prepared to enforce population policies by using bold incentives and disincentives to 
influence decisions in personal and family spheres. Successive policy changes and the 
persistence of the ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach in policy implementation even now may have 
formed a pattern of conditioning for young Singaporeans. Chen and Fawcett (1979) argue that 
this is the facilitating effect of population policies. 
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An association is created when the decision to marry or bear children is reinforced, either 
positively or negatively, by extrinsic benefits or costs, such as monetary entitlements or losses. 
Theories in economics and sociology suggest that people would eventually consider the benefits 
and costs of building a family before they respond (Bagozzi and Van Loo 1978). If this is indeed 
the decision process for some, then it is reasonable to expect that they would defer their decision 
until all the extrinsic benefits or costs are known. Since family policy incentives and 
disincentives vary periodically in Singapore, those who seek to maximize utility may postpone 
starting a family until they get the ‘best deal’ possible. Unlike in agrarian China where fertility 
was once driven by labor demands and social insurance for the elderly; in Singapore, a smaller 
nuclear family is a purposeful adaptation to the natural and socioeconomic environment, as well 
as public policy. 
 
Government Policy on Extended Families 
 
The Singaporean government’s efforts to create a national identity and restructure urban 
development have indirectly altered the concept of the extended Chinese family. In the interest 
of building a national identity with three sizeable ethic groups (Chinese, Malay, and Indian), the 
government’s imperative was to marginalize the institutions that perpetuated cultural 
segregation. The government began to enforce the use of Mandarin as the lingua franca for 
Chinese of all dialect groups and to discourage the use of dialects. The government also 
instituted an urban redevelopment plan that dispersed the concentration of clan or dialect group 
members into new housing areas which are now more ethnically diverse. Community Centers 
and Residents’ Committees were then established in each housing area to promote greater social 
interaction between members of different ethnic and dialect groups in the hopes of building a 
collective identity. For the Chinese, these policies marginalized the role of the huiguan as the 
transmitter of Chinese culture. Cheng (1995) reasons that with these developments, along with 
an increase in inter-dialect marriage, the Chinese-Singaporean identification with dialect or clan 
groups has eroded. The contemporary Chinese family institution no longer includes clan or 
dialect group members and its focus has reverted to the nuclear unit. 
 
The Contemporary Overseas Chinese Family in Singapore 
 
The Nuclear Family 
 
Latest statistical reports (e.g. Housing & Development Board 2003; Singapore Department of 
Statistics 2005, 2005; Statistics Singapore 2009) show that, in general, the nuclear Chinese 
family in Singapore has shrunk in response to the changing environment and public policy. The 
average nuclear family size is now 3.5, typically one male and one female parent and one or two 
children. This smaller unit appears to be the result of a number of trends including:  
 
• The postponement of marriage – the median age at first marriage has risen from 23 in 
1990 to 30 in 2008 (Statistics Singapore 2009), and the proportion of individuals between 
35-44 years old who are unmarried has grown (Leow 2000). 
• Changing attitudes towards courtship and marriage, particularly among females – 
surveys showed that more females than males find marriage undesirable (Chan 2002), 
and that most remained single because they have not found the ideal partner (Ministry of 
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Community Development Youth and Sports and National Family Council 2009). Overall 
marriage rates have dropped from 10 years ago, but females have a lower marriage rate 
than males (Statistics Singapore 2009).  
• Shifting priorities between work and marriage – a survey shows that many remained 
single because they wanted to focus on their studies or career and achieving material 
goals (Social Development Unit 2000). Salaries and household incomes have increased, 
but working hours are also getting longer (Singapore Department of Statistics 2005). 
• Shifting priorities between work and childbearing – married couples were surveyed and 
admitted that they currently have fewer children than they would like (Ministry of 
Community Development Youth and Sports and National Family Council 2009). Those 
surveyed would have grown up in a household of 6.2 persons just 30 years ago. Today, 
the fertility rate is 1.28 children per resident female (Statistics Singapore 2009). 
• The elevated status of women – there are more females with post-secondary qualifications 
than ever before, specifically tertiary enrollments have increased by 69% in the last 10 
years (Singapore Department of Statistics 2009). The female labor force participation has 
increased from the year 2000 to 2005 and at a higher rate than male participation 
(Singapore Department of Statistics 2005). Yet, female graduates are the largest segment 
of singles (Leow 2000). Palen (1986, 8) reports stereotypes that portray female graduates 
as “more headstrong, self-seeking, and less family oriented than their less-educated 
counterparts,” as well as, being “too fussy regarding potential spouses.” 
 
The Extended Family 
 
Since clan associations and family businesses are less prevalent in the lives of most 
Singaporeans today, the extended family appears to be restricted to the nuclear family, parents, 
siblings, and parents-in-law (Wong and Kuo 1979). By that measure, the extended Chinese 
family is evidently smaller because of lower fertility rates. The number of large households with 
six or more members has declined from 21% of all households in 1990 to 11% in 2005 
(Singapore Department of Statistics 2005).  
 
The Nuclear Family Institution 
 
The government feared that the modernization of Singapore brought significant 
detrimental changes to the nuclear family institution. Thus, in an effort to promote marriage and 
childbearing, it used the media to educate Singaporeans about the joy of married and family life. 
In reality, marriage and child-bearing are still largely the norm, and Singaporeans are likely to 
feel some anxiety or stress if they do not marry and have children (Pereira 2006). However, some 
aspects of the traditional Chinese nuclear family institution have evolved. Today, arranged 
marriages are almost obsolete and individuals are now free to find their own partner. 
Nonetheless, children still show deference toward their parents by seeking their input to 
legitimize their choice of partners. This process can be problematic with dogmatic parents in a 
society where the number of inter-ethnic marriages is on the rise (Leow 2000).  
 
Women are no longer objectified as they were before in the traditional Chinese family. 
Wives and mothers now enjoy higher status in the household. Gender roles are less defined with 
the increase in education and labor participation among females. This liberation implies that 
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power, which was traditionally conferred only through childbearing, now comes from a woman’s 
performance of other roles. In addition, since it is common for married sons to move out of their 
parents’ home, their wives are no longer in servitude to his family in the way she would have 
been in the traditional model. To a much lesser extent today, the wife does not have to contend 
with her mother-in-law and other wives or concubines. Despite polygamy being recognized 
legally in Singapore, it is less socially acceptable and practiced. A woman is now able to 
maintain continuing strong links with her own family. 
 
Alternative nuclear family arrangements are also becoming more acceptable among 
Chinese-Singaporeans. Overall, attitudes are still strongly against homosexual couples, 
cohabitation, children born out of wedlock, and divorces. However, Singaporeans under the age 
of thirty are markedly more accepting of cohabitation and divorce than older Singaporeans (Chan 
2002). Indeed, divorce rates are higher than they were ten years ago (Leow 2000). While it is 
true that marriage is still the norm, the institution of marriage can change in response to public 
policy. For example, a pro-family public housing policy has prompted Singapore couples to 
register for marriage in order to qualify for public housing, only to have the wedding ceremony 
much later. 
 
Alternative living arrangements for the nuclear family are also becoming more common. 
An interesting development is the case of ‘astronaut parents’ and ‘parachute children’ (Pe-Pua et 
al. 1996). This is a strategy where a Singaporean Chinese family seeks residency in another 
country suitable for retirement (e.g. Australia). This is a form of reverse-sojourn where the 
sojourner stays but the rest of the family moves: the wife and children are ‘parachuted’ into the 
host country while the husband remains in the home country to resume working. Periodically, the 
‘astronaut’ husband shuttles back and forth between home country and host country to fulfill the 
minimum residency requirements. Meanwhile, his family spends most of their time in the host 
country and makes periodic visits back to the home country. In this arrangement, the wife takes 
on her husband’s traditional household roles and responsibilities and the children spend very 
little time with their father.  
 
The Extended Family Institution 
 
For the fear that Westernization would erode traditional Confucian values, the 
government uses the media to promote greater kinship and interaction among extended family 
members. Most imagery in these public messages depicts a three-generation family. In reality, 
kinship and frequent interaction with extended family members are still largely the norm. Recent 
survey results indicate that the extended Chinese family in Singapore remains close-knit, 
specifically the relationship between adult children and their parents (Ministry of Community 
Development Youth and Sports and National Family Council 2009; Pereira 2006; Housing & 
Development Board 2003). Ninety percent of senior citizens received visits at least once a month 
from their married children, and 22% received daily visits. The most common reason for this is 
for childcare support and to have meals together (Housing & Development Board 2003). Two-
thirds of senior citizens receive regular cash contributions from their children, perhaps as 
nominal payments from unmarried children living with them, or from married children to offset 
the cost of babysitting and preparing meals (Ministry of Community Development Youth and 
Sports 2005).  
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Kinship with parents-in-law is also strong. Research indicates that a husband generally 
has more contact with his wife’s parents than his own (Wong and Kuo 1979). Ironically, this is a 
departure from the traditional Chinese family practice which circumscribes a daughter’s contact 
with her family after she is married into her husband’s family. Close geographic proximity 
makes it easier to maintain regular contact. In fact, the government provides financial grants to 
married couples who apply for public housing in the vicinity of their parents’ residence. Kinship 
between siblings and siblings-in-law is less strong. Wong and Kuo (1979) found that the 
relationships between siblings-in-law are generally considered obligatory, while sibling 
solidarity among middle-class Singaporeans is somewhat weak. 
 
Differences in Policy Pressure and Response 
 
Singapore’s housing, education, and population planning policies were instituted in the 
interest of building a national identity. Unfortunately, it has produced differential effects for the 
three major ethnic groups. 
 
Chinese and Other Racial Cohorts in Singapore 
 
Figures in Table 1 below show that the Chinese are the largest ethnic group in Singapore, 
while the Malays make up only 14% of Singapore’s population (unlike in Malaysia where the 
Malays are the majority). Indeed, the precarious position of the minority Chinese in Malaysia 
prompted Singapore’s secession from the Federation in 1965. The Singaporean government has 
since been careful about consolidating the interests of the majority Chinese without 
marginalizing the Malay and Indian minorities. This was particularly relevant after the 1969 riots 
between the Malays and Chinese in Malaysia spilled over onto its shores. At that time, the 
government would have been concerned about the implosion of social order because the Malays 
had a higher fertility rate than the Chinese resulting in a 7% decrease in the Chinese population 
and a 4% increase in the Malay population with each generation (Heng and Devan 1995). The 
anti-natalist policies introduced in 1966 were intended to reduce overall population growth, 
albeit, in a discriminatory manner.  
 
Table 1. Comparison of Ethnic Groups in Singapore and Malaysia  
 
Country Singapore Malaysia 
Ethnic Chinese Malay Indian Chinese Malay 
1Percentage of 
population 
76.8% 13.9% 7.9% 23.7% 50.4% 
2Household income $5,219 $3,148 $4,556 $3,456 $1,984 
3Household size 3.6 4.2 3.7 n.a. n.a. 
41960s TFR 4.3 6.3 6.7 5.2 5.4 
51987 TFR 1.5 2.2 1.9 2.2 4.5 
 
1Ethnic segment data are for 2008 and sourced from the CIA World Factbook. 
2Household monthly income in local currency; Singapore data are for 2000 and compiled by Lee (2004); Malaysia data are for 1999 and 
compiled by Chakravarty and Roslan (2005). 
3Household size data for Singapore are for 2000 and are sourced from the Singapore Census of Population 2000. 
4Singapore Total Fertility Rate data are for 1965 and compiled by Cheung (1989); Malaysia Total Fertility Rate data are for 1967 and 
compiled by Tey (2002). 
5Total Fertility Rate data for 1987 are compiled by Saw (1990). 
n.a. – not available 
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As a group, the Malays in Singapore have historically occupied a lower socioeconomic 
stratum. Their monthly household income is the lowest of the three ethnic groups (see Table 1), 
and their representation in tertiary education and professional occupations are less than that of 
the Chinese and Indians. Thus, the use of financial rewards and sanctions to influence family 
planning would necessarily mean these policies weighed more heavily on the Malays than on the 
Chinese or Indians. For example, the $10,000 cash grant for sterilization after the second child 
was offered only to non-graduate, working-class mothers, a segment that is over-represented by 
Malays. Increased delivery fees for the third child onwards were applied only to public hospitals, 
which were more likely to be utilized by Malays than Chinese. Having the largest average 
household size of all three ethnic groups, the Malays were again penalized when smaller families 
were given higher priority in public housing allocation. These incentives/disincentives had, in 
part, contributed to a significant reduction of the Malay fertility rate (from 6.3 in 1965 to 2.2 in 
1987), though a high proportion of Malays have always felt that two children were too few for 
the ideal family size (Wong 1979). This decline in fertility comes with some reluctance because, 
unlike their counterparts in Malaysia, the Singaporean Malays’ concerns about longer-term 
prospects for social mobility have likely entered into the calculus of child-bearing (Jones 1990). 
It should also be noted that, compared to the Malays, family policy pressure was less severe for 
the Indians primarily because a much larger proportion are tertiary-educated and had access to 
higher-paid occupations.  
 
The inequity of Singapore’s family policy sent implicit signals about the government’s 
position on social order. Paul (1993) argues, however, that such a policy has exalted the status of 
the Chinese and further intensified ethnic segregation. In neighboring Malaysia, the government 
had also adopted discriminatory policies, but at the expense of the Chinese instead.  
 
Overseas Chinese Families in Malaysia 
 
The Malaysian Overseas Chinese migrant is part of the same huaqiao cohort described 
earlier in the paper. Thus, the evolution of the family and family institution, leading up to 
Singapore’s independence in 1965, is similar to that of Overseas Chinese in Singapore. Their 
political situation, however, is quite different. The Malaysian government explicitly protects the 
interest of the majority Malays at the expense of the Chinese who have historically wielded more 
economic power. Figures in Table 1 show that in 1967, the Chinese and Malays had similar 
fertility rates. This alarmed the predominantly-Malay government since the Malays were under-
represented in urban centers and industry. By 1987, the Chinese fertility rate was only half of the 
Malay rate and had fallen just below the replacement level. 
 
The rapid decline in Chinese fertility emerged for two reasons. Firstly, the Chinese 
prospered proportionately more from Malaysia’s economic growth in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
This was due to the fact that they were more likely than the Malays to live in urban areas, have 
higher levels of education, have professional careers, and marry later. Thus, the declining 
fertility trend among Chinese in Hong Kong and Singapore, arising from economic growth and 
urbanization, foreshadowed the fertility trend among the Chinese in Malaysia (Jones and Leete 
2002). Secondly, but more importantly, the predominantly-Malay government instituted 
discriminatory economic policies that accelerated the decline of Chinese fertility and create 
differential demographic effects on the three major ethnic groups.  
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The New Economic Policy (NEP) implemented in 1971 sought to eliminate income 
inequality along ethnic lines through an affirmative action program that provided Malays with 
greater access to education, employment, entrepreneurship, and ownership of assets. The NEP 
concomitantly reduced the Chinese and Indian communities’ opportunities for local education 
and employment and effectively increased the cost of educating children. In the absence of the 
NEP, Govindasamy and DaVanzo (1992) reported that in 1976, Malay women desired fewer 
children (5.1) than Chinese women (5.4). However, after exposure to the NEP, the mean desired 
fertility reported in 1988 was higher for the Malays (4.8) than the Chinese (3.75). In 1987, the 
fertility rate for the Malaysian Chinese (2.2) was still higher than that of their Singaporean 
counterparts (1.5), but the rates of decline from the 1960s were comparable (see Table 1). From 
the outset of the 1990s, it was reasonable to presume that the fertility trend of the more 
successful Singaporean Chinese would be the bellwether for the Malaysian Chinese. After all, 
both countries had prospects of explosive economic growth and Chinese families were better 
poised to enjoy the trappings of modern-day urban life.  
 
This was not to be. Despite the persistent efforts of its pro-natalist policymakers,  
throughout the 1990s Malaysian Chinese fertility increased steadily above replacement levels 
while Chinese fertility in Singapore dropped even further below replacement levels (Jones and 
Leete 2002). Although both cohorts share a similar value system concerning family issues, the 
critical difference is their adaptation to policy pressure. Unlike the Chinese in Singapore, those in 
Malaysia recognize the link between population size and political power. They sense the urgency 
from being increasingly ‘crowded out’ by the Malay population which is growing in numbers 
and privilege. Indeed the Malaysian government’s public assault on the livelihood of Chinese 
families may compel them to politicize family issues and recognize that private and personal 
decisions about the family may have wider implications for their ethnic group. Leete (1996) 
explains that ‘political embattlement’ is a process by which certain ethnic groups would increase 
their fertility to prevent their political voice from diminishing. By that logic, the experiences of 
the Malay minority in Singapore and the Chinese minority in Malaysia suggest that there is a 
complex interplay between political power and population planning in both countries.  
 
Chinese Families in China 
 
The Mainland Chinese and Overseas Chinese in Singapore share the same Confucian 
family traditions. Nonetheless, differences in population planning and social policies have carved 
two diverging paths for the contemporary family institution. Quah (2005) reports that the 1995-
2000 fertility levels for Singapore and China are similar (1.7 and 1.8 respectively) although it 
should be noted that Singapore’s rapid economic growth and concomitant fertility decline 
precedes China’s by 15 years. Both countries have experienced the demographic transition that 
accompanies economic development, however, differences in population planning policies 
suggest that China’s policy pressure has been far more effective in producing the desired effect. 
Since 1979, the government in China has enforced the One-Child-Policy (OCP) by imposing 
financial sanctions for every subsequent child after the first. Whilst Fowler, Gao, and Carlson 
(2010) discuss how such a policy may have created unintended effects for the family institution 
in China today, the fact is that the fertility level is now satisfactory (Quah 2005). In contrast, 
although the government in Singapore had initially instituted an anti-natalist policy, the current 
pro-natalist policy has been in force for 23 years. It has yet to be successful in raising the fertility 
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rate above replacement level. Given this trend, it is foreseeable that the Overseas Chinese family 
in Singapore will become a one-child family akin to that in China today.  
 
Therefore, several implications of a one-child family which Fowler, Gao, and Carlson 
(2010) raise would also be pertinent to Overseas Chinese families in Singapore in the future. 
Indeed, some adjustments are already taking place in Singapore. These include cultural norms 
towards a smaller family unit, the burden of elderly care now being shouldered between fewer 
children (not unlike the 4-2-1 family problem), and the shift in parent-child power dynamics as 
family resources are dedicated to one or two offspring instead of many (not unlike China’s ‘little 
emperors). Yet there are other implications that do not apply simply because the target fertility in 
China is one child and in Singapore, it has been two or more (even the anti-natalist policy 
promoted “Stop at Two”). The liberty to have two or more children enabled Singapore to achieve 
better gender balance and it doesn’t have China’s issues associated with excess men (Zhu, Lu, 
and Hesketh 2009). Since sibship size is greater in Singapore, the average extended family would 
also include more siblings and cousins (and in turn, aunties and uncles for the next generation) 
than that of an OCP child in China.  
 
The difference in family dynamics between Chinese in Singapore and the mainland 
cannot be solely attributable to population planning policies, such as Fowler’s, Gao’s, and 
Carlson’s (this issue) argument that the Cultural Revolution has served to subvert family 
traditions and authority structure. The huaqiao Overseas Chinese in Singapore were spared of the 
Cultural Revolution and as Chen (2001) conjectured, they may be more traditional than their 
mainland counterparts. There is some evidence for this. Fowler, Gao, and Carlson reviewed 
studies which surmise a growing distance between the elderly in China and their children and 
that children in China are increasingly less filial. In contrast, the elderly in Singapore still remain 
very close to their children. Admittedly, Singaporean government policy has played no small 
part. It is cognizant of maintaining traditional family values and has used financial incentives and 
housing policies cleverly to those ends.  
 
Conclusion 
 
A common thread in this paper is the Confucian ethic that underlies a traditional Chinese 
family, the Overseas Chinese family institution, government and its family planning policy in 
Singapore. This ideology holds that the welfare of a society comes from the ability to maintain 
civil order and achieving this warrants a patriarchal authority structure. It is debatable if this 
approach brought about the desired outcomes for Singapore. Instead, unintended effects were 
created and altered the concept of the family. This discourse on the Overseas Chinese family 
covers several areas of interest to macromarketing scholars: welfare, public policy, and 
unintended effects. Commuri and Gentry (2000) prescribe the concept of family as a pertinent 
construct in macromarketing (e.g. the role of family in human welfare) and a rich area for future 
research in marketing.  
 
Naturally, a few research implications emerge for the macromarketing scholar. Firstly, if 
public policy instruments continue to reduce the calculus of marriage and childbearing decisions 
to a practical consideration of extrinsic benefits and costs, then it would be worthwhile 
identifying specific marketing or consumer theories that would be relevant to decisions on 
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fertility and family structure. Secondly, the Singaporean government’s use of promotional 
campaigns for their family policies should prompt an investigation into the role of political 
advertising in modifying cultural norms. Thirdly, the differential effect evident in the family 
policies of Singapore and Malaysia would warrant research on minority groups as vulnerable 
consumers of public policy. Finally, marketing implications of the demographic transition are of 
critical importance but remain unexplored.  
 
Changes in the family institution may be a reflection of the contemporary generation’s 
search for its identity and culture. Singapore is a modern society where cultural values from East 
and West converge and often clash. An increasing number of Chinese-Singaporeans are 
selectively abandoning their traditional beliefs as they become better educated (in the West), 
more proficient in English than in Chinese, and more cosmopolitan in their outlook (Chiew 
1995). As the generation of China-born migrants passes away, family ties with the home village 
will be lost (e.g. Lim 2002) and less of the Overseas Chinese identity will be bound to China 
(Choong 1995). The increasing rate of conversions to Christianity means that certain traditional 
Chinese customs, such as ancestor worship, will be abandoned due to the emphasis on the 
centrality of the family in life as opposed to God (Nagata 1995). Perhaps some traditional 
customs rooted in the agrarian society of rural China, such as Chinese New Year celebrations to 
usher in the crop harvest, might one day be abandoned because they are no longer relevant in the 
urban environment.  
 
These questions surrounding the abandonment or loss of traditional Chinese culture 
become more pressing as an increasing number of Overseas Chinese re-migrate to Western 
countries where they will then be a cultural minority. What then becomes of the Overseas 
Chinese family institution in the case of re-migration? It is likely that the conflict between 
Eastern and Western values will deepen and the struggle for self-identity among Overseas 
Chinese will be more difficult. Wang (1991) asserts that there are cultural norms, such as the 
preservation of family ties, which the Chinese consider binding on them as Chinese. If the 
traditional Chinese family institution is altered until it is no longer recognizable or 
distinguishable, one must wonder whether the Overseas Chinese will still be Chinese. 
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